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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
GEORGE H. CONN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

No.
8927

RICH WHITMORE,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 4, 1956 judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff
and against Defendant in a suit involving the parties in Stephenson County, Illinois, in the total amount of $816.11. This
action now before this court was commenced on that judgment,
and on June 23, 1958, Judge Aldan J. Anderson, District Court
of Salt Lake County, rendered judgment of no cause of action
in favor of the defendant, and granted defendant judgment
on his counterclaim. Appellant appeals from the judgment
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of no cause of action on the complaint. Appellant also disagrees with the District Court's award of judgment to Defendant on the counterclaim, but makes no argument on appeal
regarding the same since that decision follows the ruling of
the court on the complaint in accordance with No. 6 of the
Pre-Trial Order, Record on Appeal, page 8. We assume,
therefore, that if this court were to reverse the District Court's
ruling on the no cause of action on the complaint, the ruling
on the counterclaim would fall as well.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE ILLINOIS JUDGMENT IS ENTITLED TO
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN THE UTAH COURT UNDER ARTICLE 4, SECTION 1, U. S. CONSTITUTION.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE ILLINOIS COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
TO RENDER AN ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT OF POINTS
I. THE ILLINOIS JUDGMENT IS ENTITLED TO
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN THE UTAH COURT UNDER ARTICLE 4, SECTION 1, U. S. CONSTITUTION.

Article 4, Section 1, provides that "full faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state."
It is stated in 50 C.J.S. Judgments 889, at page 470, as

follows:
4
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"Under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution, a judgment rendered by a court of a
state, having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties, must, when properly authenticated, be given
full faith and credit by every other state. It has been
said that the obligation to accord full faith and credit
to a valid judgment, other than for lack of jurisdiction
of the person or subject matter, or for the enforcement
of a penalty, is without limitation."
It is clear that recognition of a judgment of a sister state
is required so long as full faith and credit is not sought to
enforce a judgment based upon a proceeding wanting in due
process of law. Respondent argued in the court below that
the Illinois court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment. It is appellant's contention here that the Illinois court
did have jurisdiction and that the judgment there rendered
is entitled to full faith and credit under the U. S. Constitution
in the Utah court.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE ILLINOIS COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
TO RENDER AN ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENT.
The Illinois court acquired personal jurisdiction over the
Defendant by reason of personal service upon the Defendant
in compliance with the provisions of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act, which read as follows: (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap.
110, pars. 16, 17),
"Section 16 ( 1) Personal service of summons may
be made upon any party outside the State. If upon a
citizen or resident of this State or upon a person who
has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State, it shall have the force and effect of personal

5
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service of summons within this State; otherwise it shall
have the force and effect of service by publication."
"Section 17 ( 1) Any person, whether or not a citizen
or resident of this State, who in person or through an
agent does any of the acts hereinafte~ e~~merate~,
thereby submits said person, and, if an tndtvtdual, hts
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this State as to ariy cause of action arising from the
doing of any of said acts:
" (a) The transaction of any business within this
State;
"(b) The commission of a tortious act within this
State;
" (c) The ownership, use, or possession of any
real estate situated in this State;
" (d) Contracting to insure any person, property,
or risk located within this State at the time
of contracting.

·· ( 2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as
provided in this section, may be made by personally
serving the sumtnons upon the defendant outside this
State, as provided in this Act, with the same force and
effect as though summons had been personally served
within this State.
" ( 3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an
action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon
this section.
" ( 4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the
right to serve any process in any other manner now or
hereafter provided by law."

6
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In construing this statute and its application to the case
presented by this appeal, appellant respectfully submits that
the last conclusions of the Supreme Court of Illinois should be
controlling. (See Swift & Co. vs. Weston, 88 Mont. 40; 289
P. 1035 (1930)).
An analysis of the Illinois Civil Practice Act is contained
in the case of Nelson vs. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 NE 2d
673 (1957), which is an action brought by a resident of Illinois
against a resident of Wisconsin, who was personally served
with summons outside Illinois. Plaintiff there alleged Defendant had committed a tortious act in Illinois resulting in injuries
to Plaintiff. The lower court granted Defendant's motion to
quash service of summons, but the Supren;e Court of Illinois
reversed that decision and held the provisions of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act were not unconstitutional as denying the
non-resident due process of law.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court was presented a case
coming under the subsection (b) of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act relating to the commission of a tortious act within Illinois,
while the fact situation here presented falls under subsection
(a) relating to the transaction of any business within Illinois,
nonetheless, the language and reasoning of the Illinois Supreme
Court as to their statute should be viewed with favor here.
At page 676 of the court's opinion in the Nelson vs.
Miller case, the following is said:
"The foundations of jurisdiction include the interest
that a State has in providing redress in its own courts
against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise
incur obligations to, those within the ambit of the
7
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State's legitimate protective policy. The. limits on th.e
exercsie of jurisdiction are not 'mechant~al or quantitative' (International Shoe Co. v. Washtngton, 1945,
326 U. S. 310, 319, 66 S. Ct. 154, 159, 90 L. Ed. 95)
but are to be found only in the requirement that the
provisions made for this purpose must be fa~r and reasonable in the circumstances, and must gtve to the
defendant adequate notice of the claim against him,
and an adequate and realistic opportunity to appear and
be heard in his defense."
Defendant was personally served with summons in Utah
when the Illinois action was commenced against him. He cannot
here claim that the Illinois judgment came upon him by surprise, for he chose not to contest the action there following
personal service of summons upon him.
The Illinois court continues in the Nelson vs. Miller
decision at page 676 as follows:
"The change that has occurred is made most manifest
by the decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 1945, 326 U. S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154. There the court
said: 'Historically the jurisdiction of the courts to
render judgment in personam is grounded on their de
facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court
was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714,
733, 24 L. Ed. 565. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons
or other form of notice, due process requires only that
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minin1um contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus8
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tice.' 326 U. S. at page 316, 66 S. Ct. at page 158. The
court added that the demands of due process 'may be
met by such contacts of (the defendant) to defend
the particular suit which is brought there. An 'estimate
of the inconveniences' which would result to the (defendant) from a trial away from its 'home' or principal
place of business is relevant in this connection.' 326
U. S. at page 317, 66 S. Ct. at page 158. While the
precise question related to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the State over a foreign corporation, it is clear that
the general principle underlying the decision applies
equally to jurisdiction over nonresident individuals."
The Illinois Supreme Court, in the Nelson v. Miller case,
draws an analogy between the provisions of the Civil Practices
Act and the statutes providing for substituted service on nonresident motorists who caused injury within a State. The court
traces the acceptance of those statutes from the consent theory
to the jurisdiction through appointment of an agent to accept
service. The decision of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Neirbo Co.
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 1939, 308 U. S. 165, 60 S.
Ct. 153, 128 A.L.R. 1437, is quoted as being the real basis
in fact for our present acceptance of the non-resident motorist
statutes. In commenting thereon, at page 678, in Nelson v.
Miller, the Illinois Supreme Court says:
"The basis of jurisdiction was not consent; it was
rather that the State was justified in making reasonable
provision for redress in local courts against nonresident
tortfeasers, so long as it provided reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard.''
As the joint committee that drafted the amendments in
1955 to the Illinois Civil Practice Act observed: "There would
seem to be no better notice than a summons personally served

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on a defendant." Smith-Hurd, Ill. Ann. Stat:, chap. 110, sec.
17, p. 165.
Similar statutes to the Illinois statute have been upheld
in Smythe v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 1951, 116 Vt.
569, 80 A. 2d 664, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1193, and in Johns v. Bay
State Abrasive Products Co., D.C. Md. 1950, 89 F. Supp. 654,
and Companie DeAstral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md.
338, 107 A. 2d 357 ( 1954).
While it is true that the Defendant did not enter the state
of Illinois, he did send his agent there and consummated the
sale of two horses in Illinois. Had a cause of action arisen
against the Plaintiff, Defendant could have had the protection
of the Illinois court. Appellant submits that a like basis exists
for service of a non-resident who transacts any business in
a state, as for the non-resident motorist who injures someone
in the state. Most courts have little difficulty to develop a
sound legal basis for support of service upon the secretary of
state or other fictional agent in the non-resident motorist
statutes, and, therefore, logically, why should we not reason
the case at hand similarly? The Defendant having been personally served with summons in the case before the court,
Appellant submits, should strengthen the argument that legal
reasoning in the non-resident motorist field should be extended
here.
Appellant submits, in conclusion, that the trend of the
recent decisions by the Utah Supreme Court, indicate a strong
desire to abolish all resort to fiction and to provide a forum
providing both adequate notice and opportunity for the parties
to be heard. It would seem that this was the aim in Wein v.
10
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Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P. 2d 222 (1948), which case
appeared to accept the reasoning of the International Shoe Co.
v. Washington case although does not mention it by name. In
the W ein v. Crockett case a single contract made within the
state was held sufficient to assert jurisdiction. In the case of
McGriff v. Charles Antell Inc., 256 P 2d 703, (Utah 1953),
the Utah Supreme Court held service upon the foreign corporation ineffective through an attempt to serve a local television station as agent, saying that to hold otherwise would
perhaps impede commercial intercourse. In commenting on
the Court's decision in the Charles Antell case, the Utah Law
Review states at page 527, 4 Utah Law Review: "It is difficult
to see how commercial intercourse would have been hampered
had the court found the corporation liable to suit. Following
the reasoning of the court, the corporation was, for all practical
purposes, relieved from liability for its torts committed within
the state, for in the usual case prohibitive expense will preclude
the individual plaintiff from going elsewhere to maintain the
action. In the background of United States Supreme Court
pronouncements, a constitutional requirement of due process
did not compel or require th~ Utah court to deriy jurisdiction.
The case of Western Gas Appliances, Inc., v. Servel, Inc., 257
P 2d 950 (Utah 1953) al~~ illustrates the acceptance of the
philosophy of balancing the conveniences of the parties.
Appellant respectfully suggests to this Court that in the
case at hand is an opportunity for the Utah Supreme Court to
extend this modern approach to the assertion of jurisdiction
to a fact situation deserving of favorable consideration in the
same degree, if not more, than in the cases of the non-resident
motorists, now so generally accepted. To so do here would
11
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be to only accord Appellant that which the Full Faith and
Credit clause of the U. S. Constitution assures him.
ALLAN T. HOWE
HOWE & HOWE
Attorneys for Appellant
5055 South State St.
Murray, Utah
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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